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OSAMA'S SUBMARINE: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AFTER 9/11
STEPHEN DYcus*
INTRODUCTION
A common objective of terrorists is to create a climate of fear
that erodes citizens' confidence in the ability of government to keep
them safe from harm. The desired result is to provoke changes in
certain government policies.' Osama bin Laden apparently had
this goal in mind when he approved the September 11, 2001,
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
It seems unlikely, however, that bin Laden intended for the
attacks to prompt a weakening of U.S. laws that protect public
health and the environment. Yet that has been the result.
The Department of Defense ("DOD") and others in the Bush
administration have cited the threat of a renewed terrorist attack
to argue that these laws should be relaxed to enable proper
training of American military forces and the development of new
weapons systems needed to execute the 'war on terrorism.' In early
2002, only a few months after the September 11th terrorist
attacks, the Pentagon announced a highly organized, multi-year
* Professor, Vermont Law School. I am grateful to Sara E. Baynard, Edward
Demetriou, Abigail Doolittle, Byron W. Kirkpatrick, Robin Longe, Jared Margolis,
and Jesse L. Moorman, all current or former students at Vermont Law School, for
their marvelous help with research for this article. I also appreciate advice I
received on various issues from Martha L. Judy, Patrick A. Parenteau, Joel R.
Reynolds, and Rena I. Steinzor.
' Terrorism has been called "the unlawful use or threat of violence against
persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally
intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify
their behavior or policies." PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE
ON COMBATING TERRORISM 1 (1986), available at http://www.population-
security.org/bush andterror.pdf. Similar definitions may be found in a number
of federal statutes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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campaign entitled Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative
("RRPI"). RRPI was designed to promote sweeping changes in some
of the United States' most important environmental laws.2 The
initiative included proposals to amend the Clean Air Act, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Endangered Species
Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, the Superfund law, and perhaps even the Clean Water
Act. Meanwhile, the Pentagon began moving on a broad front to
foster regulatory reforms that would make it easier for the military
to comply with these laws.3 In addition, the Bush administration
sharply limited public access to government information that
2 DEP'T OF DEF., READINESS AND RANGE PRESERVATION INITIATIVE SUMMARY
(2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter READINESS SUMMARY]; see also DEP'T OF
DEF., READINESS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE READINESS AND RANGE
PRESERVATION INITIATIVE (2003) [hereinafter READINESS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY]
(on file with author); DEP'T OF DEF., PROVISIONS TO PROTECT READINESS (2002);
Eric Pianin, Environmental Exemptions Sought for Readiness Efforts, Pentagon
Says It Needs Relief from Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2003, at A21. A number of
other documents relating to the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative
were originally posted on DOD Web sites, then removed. Materials cited here
but not bearing an Internet address and not otherwise readily available are on
file with the author.
The DOD campaign for relief from environmental regulation actually
began more than a year earlier, with complaints to Congress about constraints
on training. See Challenges to National Security: Constraints on Military
Training: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong.
(2001), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
107_househearings&docid=f:75041.wais; U.S. ARMY ENVTL. CTR., HOUSE
COMMITTEE ASKS PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS ENCROACHMENT IMPACT ON DEFENSE
TRAINING (2003) (describing a letter from House of Representatives members to
the White House, May 24, 2001), available at http://aec.army.millusaec/public
affairs/update/sumOl/sumOlO3.htm; Nancye L. Bethurem, Environmental
Destruction in the Name of National Security: Will the Old Paradigm Return in
the Wake of September 11?, 8 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 109, 120-22
(2002).
' Memorandum from Paul W. Mayberry to the Sec'ys of Military Dep'ts et al.,
Senior Readiness Oversight CouncilApproval of 2003 Sustainable Ranges Action
Agenda (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.peer.org/docs/dod/Defense_
TransformationActAnalysis.pdf (detailing the campaign).
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would enable public participation in environmental decisions
affecting the military.'
Ironically, the government's response to the September 1 1th
terrorist attacks may place the American people at greater overall
risk of harm. That is because the environmental sacrifices sought
by the Bush administration do not appear to be justified by any
resulting improvements in military readiness and national
security.
I. IS THE ENVIRONMENT WORTH FIGHTING TO PROTECT?
At the end of the Cold War, Dick Cheney, the Secretary of
Defense at that time, declared that "[d] efense and the environment
is not an either/or proposition. To choose between them is impossi-
ble in this real world of serious defense threats and genuine
environmental concerns."5 The first President Bush described
"environmental security" as a national security objective.6 Accord-
ing to the Pentagon in 1991, "Defending our national security and
protecting our environment are closely linked. Both share the
ultimate goals of ensuring our well-being and preserving our rich
Immediately after 9/11, several federal agency websites removed data that some
say could have been helpful to potential terrorists, but that also provided the
public an important window into the environmental regulatory process. See Access
to Government Information, Post September 11, available at http://72.14.207.104/
search?q=cache:Q lHJvLiEo3wJ:www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/213/l/l
+Access+to+Government+Information+Post+September+1 l+site:www.ombwatch.
org&hl=en. Access to so-called "critical infrastructure information" has been
sharply curtailed by the Homeland Security Act. See Homeland Security Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, § 214, 116 Stat. 2135, 2151 (2002). Agency officials have been
granted discretion to withhold "sensitive but unclassified" information from public
view. See GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, "SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED" AND OTHER
FEDERAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION:
HISTORYAND CURRENT CONTROVERSY (CONG. RES. SERV. RL31845) (July 2, 2003),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31845.pdf.
' Sec'y of Def. Richard B. Cheney, Address to the Defense and Environment
Initiative Forum (Sept. 3, 1990) (on file with author).
6 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, at 4
(1991), available at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm.
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national heritage."7 In 1996, DOD issued a directive announcing
its policy to "display environmental security leadership within
DOD activities worldwide" by "[e]nsuring that environmental
factors are integrated into DOD decision-making processes" and
"[p]rotecting, preserving, and, when required, restoring and
enhancing the quality of the environment. ' Seemingly long-gone
were the Cold War days when the environmental consequences of
preparing for war were ignored and the public was denied access
to information about those consequences.
Today, however, early in the second term of the second
President Bush, the Defense Department's commitment to
environmental protection is far less. clear than it was just nine
years ago. A new directive dated March 9, 2005, cancels the 1996
directive, omits the language quoted above, and commits the
government only to compliance with "applicable laws and DoD
policies."9 Another DOD publication declares, "Our strategy seeks
to maintain a reasonable balance between test and training
requirements, the concerns of our neighbors near our test and
training ranges, and the importance of sound stewardship."1 In
late 2005, Pentagon officials reported "a sea change within the
Department of Defense concerning environmental responsibility,
moving beyond rote compliance with environmental laws and
regulations toward total integration of environmental, safety, and
occupational health concerns into daily military operations, as well
as long term planning."'" DOD is transforming its "approach to
environmental management," they wrote, '%ringing it fully into
7 DEP'T OF DEF., DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A COMMITMENT MADE at 1
(1991) (on file with author).
' DOD Dir. No. 4715.1, Environmental Security 4 (Feb. 24, 1996).
9 DOD Dir. No. 4715.1E, Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health 4.6
(Mar. 9, 2005) (emphasis added); see also Truthout.org, Pentagon to Jettison
Environmental Responsibilities, (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.truthout.org/docs_
04/121504X.shtml.
lO Office of the Dep. Under Sec'y of Defense (Installations and Environment),
2004 Defense Installations Strategic Plan 4 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.
acq.osd.millie (emphasis added).
" Alex Beehler & Erin Mercer, Sea Change at Defense, ENVTL. FORUM, Sept.-Oct.
2005, at 21.
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sync with daily military operations, strategic defense planning,
and future procurement of new weapons systems."'2 One measure
of this "sea change" is an Army internal memo complaining that,
in the DOD budget request, "funding for the sustained manage-
ment of the training lands, historically accomplished in the
environmental conservation program, dwindles dramatically in
[fiscal year 2005] and [future] years."13
Environmental sacrifices may sometimes be required to
preserve national security. But it is difficult to know when these
sacrifices are truly necessary. Because of the potential gravity of
a wrong decision, doubts are usually resolved against environmen-
tal interests, especially during wartime or- a great national
emergency. To respond to these kinds of crises, Congress included
provisions in most environmental statutes that allow for their
temporary waiver on a case-by-case basis. The question facing the
nation now is whether the threat of another terrorist attack
justifies the permanent suspension of environmental protections
that do not appear to have materially affected military readiness.
II. REEXAMINING THE BALANCE AFTER 9/11
In an address at the National Defense University on
February 5, 2003, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
declared that "[t]he challenge is nothing less than supporting the
twin imperatives of producing the best-trained military force in the
world and providing the best environmental stewardship. National
security and environmental security are mutually reinforcing."' 4
The way to meet that challenge, he suggested paradoxically, is to
12 Id. at 22.
13 Memorandum from Maj. Gen. L.D. Gottardi, Dep. Chief of Staff, G-1, to the
Asst. Chief of Staff for Installation Mgmt., Environmental Funding for
Sustainable Training Ranges (Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.peer.org/
docs/dod/ArmyTrainingMemo.pdf; see also Public Employees for Environmental
Responsibility, Army Slashes Environmental Programs as "Optional" (Oct. 6,
2004), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news-id.php?row id=420.
14 Katharine Q. Seelye, Defense Dept. Forum Focuses on Environment, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6,2003, at A28 (quoting remarks made by Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Defense
Secretary, at the National Defense University's Environmental Forum).
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adopt sweeping permanent exemptions from compliance with some
environmental laws for at least some broad classes of military
activities instead of relying on executive waivers based on case-by-
case determinations of need. 5 A short time later he directed that,
in the meantime, the secretaries of the three service branches
should "give greater consideration to requesting [case-by-case]
exemptions in cases where environmental requirements threaten
our continued ability to properly train and equip the men and
women of the Armed Forces."' 6
The campaign to promote the Readiness and Range Preser-
vation Initiative ("RRP") has been punctuated by patriotic
rhetoric suggesting that Americans must choose between national
security and environmental security. For example, one Pentagon
official has stated that
[t]he Army has endeavored to take care of the 16.5
million acres America has entrusted to us. But
America also entrusts us with an even more precious
resource-her sons and daughters. We are committed
to providing our soldiers with the most realistic
training possible, to ensure [that] they come home to
their families. 7
The Army insists that live-fire exercises "cannot be reduced
without serious degradation to readiness and the concurrent
increased risk to American soldiers."'" DOD has even put out a
15 Id.
1 Memorandum from Deputy Sec'y of Def. Paul Wolfowitz to Sec'ys of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, Consideration of Requests for Use of Existing Exemptions
Under Federal Environmental Laws (Mar. 7, 2003) (on file with author).
17 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Readiness of the H. Armed Servs. Comm.,
108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Raymond J. Fatz, Deputy Asst. Sec'y of the
Army for Env't, Safety, and Occupational Health), available at http://www.
house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-03-
13fatz.html.
"s Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Readiness of the H. Armed Servs
Comm., 107th Cong. 3 (2002) (statement of Mario P. Fiori, Asst. Sec'y of the
Army for Installations and Env't), available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/
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detailed public affairs guidance document to promote the RRPI,
with dozens of talking points, such as, "To win the war against
terrorism and get ready for future battles, the U.S. military must
be prepared."19
Early in the RRPI campaign, the Pentagon claimed that
compliance with several environmental laws exacerbated problems
of "encroachment," which is defined as "the cumulative result of
any and all outside influences that inhibit normal military
training and testing."2 According to DOD, "most, if not all,
encroachment issues result from population growth and urbaniza-
tion" near military bases.2' Growth and urbanization reduce
critical habitat for threatened and endangered species off the bases
(increasing pressure for protection of those species on the bases),
create demand for underground drinking water sources that may
be contaminated by military activities, create competition for the
radio frequency spectrum and air space, generate conflicts over
noise, and threaten air quality.22 A different kind of encroachment
arises from military compliance with laws regulating maritime
openingstatementsandpressreleases/107thcongress/02-03-14fiori.html.
19 OFFICE OF THE ASST. SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR THE READINESS AND RANGE PRESERVATION INITIATIVE
(RRPI) (2002), available at http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/pa/pan/PAG/RRPI.
rtf.
20 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY TRAINING: DOD NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN TO MANAGE ENCROACHMENT ON TRAINING RANGES (GAO-02-727T) 1 n.2
(May 16, 2002) (statement of Barry W. Holman, Dir., Def. Capabilities & Mgmt.,
before the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d02727t.pdf [hereinafter DOD NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN].
21 Id. at 8.
22 Id. at 4-5; see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY TRAINING: DOD LACKS
A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO MANAGE ENCROACHMENT ON TRAINING RANGES (GAO-
02-614) (June 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02614.pdf
[hereinafter DOD LACKS A COMPRHENSIVE PLAN]; DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRAINING RANGE
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 10, 31-36 (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mill
prhome/docs/rptcongress.pdf [hereinafter REPORT TO THE CONGRESS]. The latter
document provides a good overview of the DOD's management of its range
complexes and operating areas.
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23
activities. Encroachment reportedly "has generally limited the
extent to which training ranges are available or the types of
training that can be conducted. This limits units' ability to train as
they would expect to fight and causes workarounds that may limit
the amount or quality of training."24
The Defense Department insists that Congress never
intended that some of the environmental laws would apply to its
operational and training ranges. 25 What DOD seeks in its legisla-
tive package, it says, is "clarification" of Congress' "original
intent."26 The Pentagon claims that the proposed changes "simply
confirm the way existing laws and regulations are currently
administered, thereby safeguarding these existing practices
against litigation seeking to overturn them."27 This reference is to
several recent citizens' suits to force DOD compliance with the law.
23 See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 22, at 33.
24 DOD NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 20, at 6; see also Thomas N.
Ledvina, Defending America-A Question of Balance: The Department of
Defense's Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative, SJ023 ALl-ABA 163, 169-
79 (2003) (assessing encroachment arising from the enforcement of
environmental laws). According to one commentator,
Encroachment negatively affects readiness by reducing the
number of available training days; reducing training realism as
tactics are modified (altitudes, airspeeds, profiles) ... causing a
loss of range access altogether (either temporary or permanent);
decreasing scheduling flexibility and complexity . . . and
increasing time away from home during training prior to
deployment. Encroachment is often gradual and can go
unnoticed, but its impacts cumulatively erode our ability to
deploy combat ready Sailors and Marines.
Eric Montalvo, Comment, Operational Encroachment: Woodpeckers and Their
Congressman, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 219, 226 (2002); see also Catherine
M. Vogel, Military Readiness and Environmental Security-Can They Co-Exist?,
39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 315, 339-43 (2004) (analyzing claims that the
enforcement of environmental laws have impaired military readiness).
25 DEP'T OF DEF., ROUNDTABLE ON RANGE AND READINESS PRESERVATION
INITIATIVE (2004) 1-3, (statement of Paul Mayberry, Deputy Undersec'y of Def.
for Readiness), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20O4
0406-0582.html [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE].
26 Id. at 1-2.
27 READINESS SUMMARY, supra note 2.
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DOD claims that one citizens' suit threatened to interrupt
its naval bombardment of a small Pacific island, interfering with
its preparation for the war in Afghanistan. 2' Another, it asserts,
might have shut down firing and weapons test ranges around the
country.29 And a third made it more difficult for the Navy to detect
enemy submarines.3" DOD has complained in various fora that
training schedules and routines have had to be altered in order to
accommodate environmental concerns.31
The evidence that compliance with environmental laws has
seriously impaired U.S. preparations for war is, however, far from
conclusive. After all, the U.S. military's successes in Afghanistan
and Iraq were achieved using troops trained and weapons tested
under pre-September 1 1th environmental statutes and regulations.
A Navy Admiral, testifying before Congress in support of RRPI in
2003, declared that "the readiness of the Navy is excellent. 32
According to a General Accounting Office report in 2002, "[d]espite
the loss of some capabilities, service readiness data do not indicate
the extent to which encroachment has significantly affected
reported training readiness. 33 In fact, the report concluded,
"[tiraining readiness, as reported in official readiness reports,
remains high for most units., 34 Environmental Protection Agency
28 ROUNDTABLE, supra note 25, at 2. The lawsuit in question is described infra
notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 191-251 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 139-73 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Environmental Sustainment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Readiness and Mgmt. Support of the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Adm. William J. Fallon, Vice Chief of Naval Operations), available
at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/March/FaUon.pdf [hereinafter
Fallon]; ROUNDTABLE, supra note 25, at 14.
32 Fallon, supra note 31, at 2.
33 DOD LACKS A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 22, at 3; cf. DEP'T OF DEF.,
FACT SHEET ON THE JUNE 2002 GAO REPORT ON MILITARY TRAINING: QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS (n.d.).
34 DOD LACKS A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 22, at 3; see also DOD NEEDS
A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 20, at 8.
Even though in testimonies and during many other occasions
DOD officials have cited encroachment as preventing the
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("EPA") Administrator Christine Todd Whitman went further in
early 2003, stating, "I don't believe that there is a training mission
anywhere in the country that is being held up or not taking place
because of environmental protection regulation."35 A more recent
study by the Congressional Research Service noted that
"[a]lthough DOD has cited some examples of training restrictions
or delays at certain installations and has used these as the basis
for seeking legislative remedies, the department does not have a
system in place to comprehensively track these cases and deter-
mine their impact on readiness. '"36
Some have taken a dimmer view of DOD's protests. EPA
complained that the definition of "military readiness activities"
in the DOD proposal was "broad and unclear and could be read to
encompass more than the Department intends."37 Congressman John
Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan, was much more emphatic: "I
have dealt with the military for years and they constantly seek
to get out from under environmental laws. But using the threat of
9-11 and al Qaeda to get unprecedented environmental immunity
is despicable. 38
services from training as they would like, DOD's primary
readiness reporting system does not reflect the extent to which
encroachment is a problem. In fact, it rarely cites training range
limitations at all.
Id.
3' Eric Pianin, Environmental Exemptions Sought; For Readiness Efforts, Pentagon
Says It Needs Relief from Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2003, at A21 (discussing a
hearing before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee).
3 6 DAVID M. BEARDEN., EXEMPTIONS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (CONG. RES. SERV.
RS22149) (June 2, 2005) at 3, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RS22149.pdf.
3' Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA's Comments on DOD's FY 04 Legislative Proposals
to the National Defense Authorization Act, at 6, available at http://www.peer.org-
docs/epa/EPAComments_D ODFY04_Proposals.pdf.
31 Press Release, Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democrats, Bush
Administration Takes Aim at Migratory Birds: Legislation Unilaterally Exempts
Military from Environmental Law (Oct. 22, 2002), available at http://www.house.
gov/commerce democrats/press/107nr59.shtml.
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If enforcement of the pre-September 11th laws did threaten
readiness, four of the six environmental statutes targeted by DOD
already provided for an executive waiver of their application when
required by national security. 9 Experience indicates, however,
that such waivers will rarely, if ever, be requested. Yet if environ-
mental values are to be sacrificed in the name of national security,
these waivers provide a measure of political accountability for the
trade-off. By eliminating the need to utilize the waivers, the
proposed amendments would allow the Bush administration to
avoid responsibility for case-by-case exemptions and shift any
blame, instead, to Congress.
Despite these doubts, Congress was persuaded to dramati-
cally weaken the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 2002. The following
year, Congress adopted amendments to the Endangered Species
Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act that may enable the
massive destruction of wildlife previously protected by those
statutes. The Pentagon also continues to work hard for changes to
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and
the Clean Air Act that would significantly threaten public health
and the environment without demonstrably improving military
readiness.4"
39 E.G. Willard, Tom Zimmerman & Eric Bee, Environmental Law and National
Security: Can Existing Exemptions in Environmental Laws Preserve DOD
Training and Operational Prerogatives Without New Legislation?, 54 A.F. L.
REV. 65 (2004) (describing the various exemptions, and arguing that DOD
should not have to rely on the exemptions to conduct necessary readiness
activities). In 1997, Congress also enacted a measure that permits the Secretary
of Defense to obtain a moratorium of up to five days on an administrative action
initiated by another agency that he determines will "affect[] training or any
other readiness activity in a manner that has or would have a significant
adverse effect on the military readiness of any of the armed forces or a critical
component thereof," unless the head of the other agency determines that a delay
would "pose an actual threat of an imminent and substantial endangerment to
public health or the environment." 10 U.S.C. § 2014 (2000). This provision has
never been invoked.
40 See Felicity Barringer, Pentagon Is Pressing to Bypass Environmental Laws
for War Games and Arms Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A15.
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This Article examines these recently enacted and proposed
changes to environmental legislation. The inescapable conclusion
is that DOD has not yet made a convincing case that the environ-
mental sacrifices it seeks are necessary.
III. THE READINESS AND RANGE PRESERVATION INITIATIVE
The RRPI was originally a package of legislative proposals
purportedly designed to "protect the lives and well-being of citizens
of the United States and preserve their freedoms, economic
prosperity, and environmental heritage by ensuring military
readiness."41 Its aim was to amend six federal environmental
statutes to make it easier for DOD to comply with the statutes. In
this section each proposal is considered in turn.
A. Migratory Bird Treaty Act
One of the statutes targeted by the RRPI was the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"). 42 The MBTA was created for the
purpose of implementing United States obligations under bilateral
treaties with four other nations, the earliest of which dates back to
1916. 43 These treaties were designed to stop the "indiscriminate
41 READINESS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 2.
42 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-12 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
41 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain (for Canada) for the
Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, as
amended by Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-28 (1996) [hereinafter Canada Treaty];
Convention Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mexico,
Feb. 7, 1936, 49 Stat. 1556 (as amended Mar. 10, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 260)
[hereinafter Mexico Treaty]; Convention Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory
Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, U.S.-Japan,
Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329 (as amended Sept. 19, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 3373)
[hereinafter Japan Treaty]; Convention Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of
Migratory Birds and their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 19, 1976, 29 U.S.T.
4647 [hereinafter U.S.S.R. Treaty].
[Vol. 30:1
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slaughter"" of migratory birds and to prevent their extinction.4 5
The two most recent treaties and a 1995 protocol to the oldest
treaty call specifically for protection of the birds' habitats.46
Despite these broad goals, the treaties allow the killing of
migratory birds under certain limited circumstances, including
seasonal hunting; the protection of agriculture, persons, and
property; scientific research and education; and hunting by
indigenous peoples. 47 No indication appears in the language of any
of the treaties or in the histories of their approval by the U.S.
Senate that any thought was given to suspending the protection of
migratory birds for reasons of national security.
The MBTA states that "[s]ubject to the provisions [of] and in
order to carry out the purposes of the conventions," the Secretary
of the Interior is authorized to adopt regulations that allow the
hunting, taking, or killing of migratory birds. 4' The regulations
must be "compatible with the terms of the conventions '49 and must
"implement the provisions" of those conventions.5" The resulting
44 Canada Treaty, supra note 43.45 Id., supra note 43; Mexico Treaty, supra note 43; Japan Treaty, supra note 43;
U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 43.
41 Japan Treaty, supra note 43, art. VI(a); U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 43, art.
IV.A; Canada Treaty, supra note 43, PROTOCOL AMENDING THE 1916
CONVENTION, ART. IV.
4' The treaty with Great Britain, for example, allows the killing of birds "which,
under extraordinary conditions, may become seriously injurious to the
agricultural or other interests in any particular community." Canada Treaty,
supra note 43, art. VII. The term "other interests" is not defined, and it is not
addressed in the Senate debates on the treaty. The treaty with Mexico provides
only for seasonal hunting and for killing migratory insectivorous birds "when
they become injurious to agriculture and constitute plagues" or escape from
reserves or game farms. Mexico Treaty, supra note 43, art. II(E). The treaty with
Japan allows takings only for "scientific, educational, propagative or other
specific purposes not inconsistent with the objectives" of the treaty; for
protection of "persons and property;" during hunting seasons; on private game
farms; and by indigenous peoples. Japan Treaty, supra note 43, art. 111.1. The
treaty with the U.S.S.R. is essentially the same. U.S.S.R. Treaty, supra note 43,
art. II.1.
48 16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2000).
49 
id.
50 16 U.S.C. § 712(2) (2000).
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regulations call for, inter alia, permits to kill migratory birds in an
"emergency"' or for a "special purpose" based on a "compelling
justification."52 None of these terms is defined, however, and none
of the regulations containing these terms has ever been invoked to
allow takings or killings by the military. There is no evidence to
show that U.S. military operations were affected in any way by the
requirements of the statute until very recently.
The impetus for a statutory change came in Center for
Biological Diversity v. Pirie, a suit by an environmental group
challenging the Navy's and Air Force's use of Farallon de
Medinilla, a tiny island near Guam, as a practice range for live-fire
aerial and naval bombardment.53 The island is home to at least
fifteen marine birds protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act.54 The Navy had applied to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
("FWS") and was denied a permit for "incidental" takes.55 The FWS
declared, however, that it would exercise its "enforcement discre-
tion" to allow the bombardment to continue.56
A federal district court expressed surprise at the Navy's
argument that the bombing would be beneficial for the birds
because it would discourage other forms of "human intrusion."57
The court also dismissed a challenge to the plaintiffs standing,
first advanced by amicus Washington Legal Foundation. The Navy
51 50 C.F.R. § 13.4 (2004).
52 50 C.F.R. § 21.27 (2004).
13 See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161 (finding violation of
MBTA), 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (enjoining military activity on island) (D.D.C. 2002),
vacated and remanded by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1110 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003)
(unpublished opinion). The island and the military's use of it are described in
Farallon de Medinilla (FDM) 16 * 01' north latitude, 146 * 04' east longitude,
GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG (2002), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/
farallon-de-medinilla.htm.
4 Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
In its permit application, the Navy invoked 50 C.F.R. § 21.41, a regulation that
allows killing for "depredation control." The court found that the regulation
"clearly does not apply to defendants' military training activities." Pirie, 191 F.
Supp. 2d at 166-67.
56 Id. at 168.
57 Id. at 167 n.2.
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argued that the more birds it killed, the more enjoyment the
plaintiff s members would get from seeing the ones that remained,
because those birds would be rarer!"8 The federal government was
admonished by the court to "refrain from making or adopting such
frivolous arguments in the future."59
The Navy argued that the island's "critical role in Marine
aviation military readiness, and therefore national security, has
dramatically increased since the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks."6 The Seventh Fleet's Vice Admiral stated, "I do not
propose that the loss of one target range will cause a complete
collapse in readiness; however, it will unquestionably make it all
the more difficult to maintain an acceptable level of readiness."'"
While the court acknowledged the "weight and importance of the
United States' interest in using [the island] for military training,
particularly at this point in time, 62 the court ultimately held that
it had "no authority to read into a criminal statute such as the
MBTA an exception for national security or military activities
where none exists."63 Therefore, once the court found that the Navy
was violating the MBTA, it ordered the bombing to stop immedi-
ately.64 The injunction was stayed pending appeal.65
58 Id. at 170-73.
59 Id. at 173.
60 Id. at 166.
61 Id. at 169 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 201 F. Supp. 2d at 122.
63 Id. at 115.
64 Id. at 123. The decision was later characterized in testimony before Congress
as a "judicial expansion of prohibitions under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act."
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality and Subcomm. on
Env't and Hazardous Materials, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement of Raymond F. DuBois, Deputy Under Sec'y of Def. for
Installations and Environment and Benedict C. Cohen, Deputy Gen. Counsel for
Environment and Installations, U.S. Dept. of Defense), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-04-2lCohen-DuBois.doc [hereinafter
DuBois Testimony].
65 Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. England, No. 02-5163, No. 02-518, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11493 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2002) (cases consolidated).
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The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment worried that because "almost all species of birds
everywhere are migratory... the holding in [Pirie] puts at risk all
military aviation, military telecommunications, and live-fire
training nationwide."66 He also declared that the Interior Depart-
ment faced "insuperable administrative difficulty in issuing site-
specific special-purpose permits for the hundreds of DOD bases
and activities implicating the MBTA."67 Yet he failed to explain
why the Pentagon had not applied for and could not obtain a
"special-purpose" permit for Farallon de Medinilla. His remarks
seem to have ignored very extensive existing DOD programs
designed to protect migratory birds.6"
DOD's arguments nevertheless carried the day. Before the
appeal in Pirie could be heard, Congress passed, and President
Bush signed into law, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization
Act, which substantially amended the MBTA.69 The amendments
direct the Secretary of the Interior, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense, to prescribe new regulations that allow the
"incidental taking" of migratory birds during "training and
operations by the Armed Forces that relate to combat" and during
the testing of military equipment and weapons.7 ° Until the
regulations take effect, the MBTA does not apply to the incidental
66 Raymond F. DuBois, The Readiness Preservation Initiative, ENVTL. FORUM,
Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 43, 44.
67 Id.
6 See Migratory Bird Permits; Take of Migratory Birds by Department of
Defense, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,074, 31,076-78 (June 2, 2004) [hereinafter Migratory
Bird Permits].
69 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-314, § 315, 116 Stat. 2458, 2509 (2002) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. II 2002)); see also PAMELA BALDWIN, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT (ESA), MIGRATORY BIRD TREATYACT, AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(DOD) READINESS ACTIVITIES: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT LAW (CONG. RES.
SERV. RL31415) (Aug. 9, 2004), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/
CRSreports/04Aug/RL31415.pdf; Erin Truban, Comment, Military Exemptions
from Environmental Regulations: Unwarranted Special Treatment or Necessary
Relief?, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 139 (2004).
70 Bob Stump Act, supra note 69, §§ 315(d), (f)(1).
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taking of a migratory bird during military readiness activities.7"
During the interim period and afterward, however, DOD must
consult with the Secretary of the Interior to identify measures to
"minimize and mitigate, to the extent practicable, any adverse
impacts" on migratory birds and also take measures to monitor
those impacts.72 Seven weeks after Congress amended the statute,
Pirie was dismissed as moot.
7 3
New regulations called for in the amendments were
proposed on June 2, 2004,"4 but they have not yet been finalized.
In addition to a general authorization of incidental takes of
migratory birds during readiness activities,75 the proposed
regulations include two potentially important limitations not found
in the statutory amendment. The first limitation is that the
Secretary of the Interior must suspend authorization for a
particular readiness activity if she finds, after consulting with the
Secretaries of State and Defense, that it would not be "compatible"
with one of the migratory bird treaties.76 It may be argued,
however, that both the 2002 amendments to the MBTA and the
proposed regulations are incompatible with United States'
obligations under those treaties, in light of the fact that no
provision was made in any of the treaties for exemptions to protect
national security.
The second limitation is that the Secretary of the Interior
may withdraw authorization for a particular activity if she
determines that it would result in a "significant adverse effect on
the sustainability of the population" of a migratory bird species of
concern,77 meaning
71 Id. §§ 315(a), (c).
72 Id. § 315(b).
71 Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. England, Nos. 02-5163, 02-5180, 2003 WL 179848
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003). The Pirie litigation is traced in Vogel, supra note 24,
at 321-30.
74, Migratory Bird Permits, supra note 68.
75 Id. at 31,085 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15(a)).
76 Id. (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15(b)(1)).
" Id. (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15(b)(2)).
2005]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
an effect that could result in a population no longer being
maintained at a "biologically viable level for the long term."
A population is "biologically viable for the long term" when
its ability to maintain its genetic diversity, to reproduce,
and to perform its role or function in its native ecosystem
[is] not irreversibly harmed."8
Withdrawal of authorization on sustainability grounds cannot take
place until the Secretary of the Interior determines, after confer-
ring with the Pentagon, that DOD failed to implement appropriate
"conservation measures" to protect the birds-measures that are
"economically feasible," and that do not "limit the effectiveness of
military readiness activity."79 In other words, a population may be
pushed to, and perhaps even over, the brink of extirpation on the
basis of very broad criteria, following a non-public negotiation
between agencies that seem determined to downplay the impor-
tance of environmental values.8 0 Notably, the proposed regulations
provide for exemption of "military readiness activities" for defense
contractors, as well as for DOD itself."1
The statutory change is not specific to the tiny island of
Farallon de Medinilla, but applies to military readiness activities
everywhere. It is not clear how, or even if, in response to the
amendments, DOD will change its patterns of training and
weapons testing at bases around the world. The Pentagon may
legally be able to abandon existing practices designed to avoid the
disturbance of nesting and resting sites and the disruption of
78 Id. at 31,084 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.3).
79 Id. at 31,085 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.15(b)(2)(i)). Authorization may
also be withdrawn if DOD fails either to conduct agreed upon monitoring or to
furnish information requested by the Interior Secretary. Id. at 31,085 (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.15(b)(2)(ii), (iii)).
8 The Department of Interior observed that "given the importance of military
readiness to national security, it is especially important not to create a complex
process that, while perhaps useful in other contexts, might impede the timely
carrying-out of military readiness activities." Id. at 31,082.81 Id. at 31,084 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 21.3).
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seasonal migrations to some degree, and DOD may decide not to
undertake new efforts to avoid takes. It is not clear that such
changes would materially improve the readiness of U.S. military
forces, because the Pentagon was never required to demonstrate
precisely how its compliance with the MBTA affected readiness. It
is apparent, however, that the amendments could result in
substantial new impacts on migratory birds and their habitats.8 2
B. Endangered Species Act
No part of the RRPI has generated more controversy than
its effort to amend the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 3 The
Defense Department has a long-standing commitment to bio-
diversity conservation as "the foundation of sensible military
natural resources management."' Several years ago DOD declared
that promoting biodiversity "[h]elps maintain natural landscapes
for realistic military training" and "contributes directly to military
82 According to the announcement of the proposed regulations, "the Department
of Defense will use the NEPA process to determine whether any ongoing or
proposed military readiness activity is 'likely to result in a significant adverse
effect on the population of a migratory bird species of concern."' Id. at 31,079. On
the other hand, the Interior Department determined that the proposed
regulations themselves were "categorically excluded" from the NEPA process.
Id. at 31,083-84. The NEPA process applied to individual activities will not in
and of itself prevent harm to the birds, but it will require consideration of that
harm in the decision to continue or initiate an activity. That process may provide
the only public notice and opportunity to comment on adverse effects, since no
such provision is made either in the MBTA or in the proposed regulations. The
proposed rule does not purport to authorize the taking of species of birds listed
under the Endangered Species Act, which will continue to regulate activities
affecting such species. Id. The operation of the Endangered Species Act is
analyzed in the next section of this article.
83 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
84 DEP'T OF DEF., DOD COMMANDER'S GUIDE TO BIODIVERSITY 2, available at
http://www.denix.osd. mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Conservation/Guide/
guide.html.
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readiness." 5 Yet the potential for conflict with readiness goals is
clear.
1. Eliminating "Critical Habitat"
After 9/11, DOD complained that designation under the ESA
of "critical habitat"8 on lands it owns or controls made its bases
more expensive to manage and placed some base lands off-limits
to certain kinds of training activities.8 7 Land determined to be
"critical habitat" includes geographical areas occupied by a listed
species that contain physical or biological features essential to the
conservation of the species and that "may require special manage-
ment considerations or protection," as well as other areas deter-
mined by the Secretary of the Interior to be essential for the
conservation of the species."8 The statute requires DOD to avoid
"the destruction or adverse modification" of designated critical
habitat for some 300 listed species found on or near its properties.8 9
The Defense Department maintained that it should not be
necessary to designate critical habitat on any base that adopted
"an integrated natural resources management plan" ("INRMP")
8' Id. at 2, 8; see also KEYSTONE CTR., POLICY DIALOGUE ON A DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE (DOD) BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (1996), available at
https://www.denix.osd.mil/Public/ES-Programs/conservation/strategy/
strategy.html (discussing the ecological diversity of the varied DOD land
holdings, the importance of maintaining such diversity for military purposes,
and for the role of the federal government as protector of public lands).
86 ESA §§ 4(a)(3)(A), 4(b)(2); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(3)(A), (b)(2) (2000).
87 See, e.g., Impact of Environmental Encroachment on Military Training:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Readiness and Mgmt. Support of the S. Comm.
on Armed Servs., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Gen. John M. Keane, U. S.
Army Vice Chief of Staff), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/
statemnt/2003/March/Keane.pdf.
88 ESA § 3(5)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (2000).
9 ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000); see also Paul C. Kiamos, National
Security and Wildlife Protection: Maintaining an Effective Balance, 8 ENVTL.
LAW. 457, 493-512 (2002) (describing the general operation of the Act and its
application to the Navy in particular).
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under § 101 of the Sikes Act.9" The Sikes Act requires DOD, in
cooperation with the FWS and state fish and wildlife authorities,
to prepare an INRMP for each military installation in the United
States containing "significant natural resources."'" Therefore,
plans are required for all bases where the ESA might apply.92
These plans must, to the extent "appropriate and applicable,
provide for fish and wildlife management, land management...
wetland protection," and other environmental concerns.93 They
must, however, be "[c]onsistent with the use of military installa-
tions to ensure the preparedness of the Armed Forces,"94 and they
must allow "no net loss in the capability of military installation
lands to support the military mission of the installation."95 In other
words, environmental concerns affect planning only when they do
not interfere with military activities.
DOD nevertheless argued that INRMPs "offer superior
protection for species because they consider the base's environment
holistically, rather than using an obsolete and unscientific species-
by-species analysis."96 The analysis required by the Endangered
Species Act is hardly unscientific, however, since the ESA calls for
critical habitat to be designated "on the basis of the best scientific
data available."97 Moreover, it is doubtful that INRMPs offer
superior protection for species, since the Sikes Act states that the
90 16 U.S.C. § 670a (2000).
91 Id. § 670a(a)(1)(B). See generally DEP'T OF DEF., RESOURCES FOR INRMP
IMPLEMENTATION: A HANDBOOK FOR THE DOD NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGER
(n.d.), available at www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Conservation/
Legacy/INRMP/inrmphb.pdf.
92 In fact, DOD has completed INRMPs for 95% of its installations. See Fiscal
Year 2005 Appropriations: Military Constr.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Military Constr. of the S. Appropriations Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement
of Raymond F. DuBois, Deputy Undersec'y of Def.), available at http://64.233.
161.104/search?q=cache:AK4drz-YDR8J:www.globalsecurity.org/military/libr
ary/congress/2004_hr/040330-dubois.htm.
93 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a(b)(1)(A)-(H) (2000).
94 See id. § 670a(b).
95 Id. § 670a(b)(1)(I).
96 DuBois, supra note 66, at 44.
97 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000).
2005]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
protection of wildlife must always be subordinated to the military
mission of the installation." By contrast, the ESA requires that
listed species "be afforded the highest of priorities."9 9
The FWS provided qualified support for the Pentagon's
position. In testimony before Congress, FWS argued that lands
covered by INRMPs which "adequately manage" for listed species
needed no "special management considerations or protection," and
therefore that they did not meet the ESA's definition of "critical
habitat."'00 In April 2003, FWS issued a proposed rule refusing to
designate critical habitat for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher at
Miramar Marine Air Station, in part because Miramar had a
"complete and approved INRMP" that FWS found would provide
"adequate conservation management and protection" for the
species.' On another occasion, however, FWS designated critical
98 16 U.S.C. § 670a(b)(1)(I) (2000).
9 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
10 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water, S.
Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Craig
Manson, Asst. Sec'y for Fish and Wildlife, Dep't of the Interior). Criteria for
nondesignation of critical habitat on lands covered by INRMPs were spelled out
in an earlier notice.
Military installations with approved INRMPs which address the
needs of species generally do not meet the definition of critical
habitat discussed above as they require no additional special
management or protection. Therefore, we do not include these
areas in critical habitat designations if they meet the following
three criteria: (1) A current INRMP must be complete and
provide a benefit to the species; (2) the plan must provide
assurances that the conservation management strategies will be
implemented; and (3) the plan must provide assurances that the
conservation management strategies will be effective, by
providing for period monitoring and revisions as necessary. If all
of these criteria are met, then the lands covered under the plan
would not meet the definition of critical habitat.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Designation of Critical
Habitat for Holocarpha Macradenia (Santa Cruz Tarplant), 67 Fed. Reg. 63,968,
63,974 (Oct. 16, 2002) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. at pt. 17) [hereinafter Final
Designation of Critical Habitat for Holocarpha Macradenia].
1' Proposed Rules: Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation
of Critical Habitat for the Coastal California Gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica)
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habitat on a military installation for the Santa Cruz Tarplant
when it found that an INRMP did "not contain assurances that the
management actions it describes will be implemented or
effective."' 2
In January 2003, a federal district court in Arizona struck
down FWS's approach in a case involving "management plans" for
federal and tribal lands.0 3 In the Mexican spotted owl case the
court derided FWS's interpretation of the ESA requirement to
designate critical habitat as "nonsensical."'0 4 "The fact that a
habitat is already under some sort of management for its conserva-
tion," said the court, "is absolute proof that such habitat is 'criti-
cal.""0 5 DOD worried that the precedent would be used to require
designation of critical habitat at many more of its bases.
2. Red-Cockaded Workarounds
Evidence that changes in the Endangered Species Act were
needed to enhance military readiness is difficult to find. Indeed,
DOD seemed to have gotten along pretty well under the pre-9/11
rules.
Under ESA section 4(b)(2), the Secretary of the Interior may
designate an area as critical habitat only after taking into account
the economic "and any other relevant impact[s]" of the
designation.0 6 She can exclude an area from designation if she
determines that the benefits of exclusion outweigh the disadvan-
tages, unless she finds that failure to designate would result in
extinction of a species. If DOD can make a strong case for unre-
stricted use of a given area, the Secretary can decline to designate
and Determination of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segment for the California
Gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica), 68 Fed. Reg. 20,228, 20,234, 20,237
(proposed Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
102 Final Designation of Critical Habitat for Holocarpha Macradenia, supra note
100 at 63,974.
'03 Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Ariz. 2003).
104 Id. at 1098.
105 Id. at 1099.
106 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000).
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it as critical habitat. In April 2003, the Secretary of the Interior
invoked the "any other relevant" provision to decline critical
habitat designation for a listed bird at two Southern California
military bases because of the potential impact on "our country's
national security interest[s]. '"17 Such a determination is entitled
to some deference by the courts.10
8
Economic workarounds are also possible. At Fort Irwin,
California, the Pentagon complained several years ago that
"maneuver training" was "effectively eliminated" on 22,000 acres
designated as critical habitat for the endangered Desert
Tortoise.'0 9 In 2000, however, Congress authorized the expenditure
of up to $75 million to acquire and manage additional lands for
preservation and mitigation measures for the tortoise and another
listed species, the Lane Mountain Milkvetch. 1 The Army expected
that the mitigation measures would allow a quick resumption of
training on the 22,000 acres.1
11
In other instances, the Army says it "has been very success-
ful protecting endangered species by working with adjacent
landowners to achieve mutual conservation goals." '112 At Camp
Lejeune in North Carolina, the Nature Conservancy helped secure
the purchase of 2,500 acres next to the base that were slated for a
housing development. This tract will be turned over to the state for
park land."' At Fort Bragg, the Army obtained access to additional
training lands off-post, allowing it to conserve red-cockaded
woodpecker habitat on the installation." 4 A provision of the Fiscal
107 Proposed Rules, supra note 101, 68 Fed. Reg. at 20,237-38.
10' Ctr. for Bio. Diversity, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
109 See Fatz, supra note 17, at 10.
110 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 323, 114 Stat.
2763, 2763A-186 to -187 (2000).
ill See Keane, supra note 87, at 5.
112 Id.
113 See Encroachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Readiness and Mgmt.
Support of the S. Armed Servs. Comm. (2003) (statement of Gen. William L.
Nyland, Asst. Commandant of the Marine Corps), available at http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/March/Nyland.pdf.
114 Fiori, supra note 18, at 3.
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Year 2003 Defense Authorization Act allows the Pentagon to
establish "buffer zones" around bases to curtail encroachment from
urban development.' 15 That authority has been used to purchase
8,500 acres of black bear habitat adjacent to Camp Blanding in
Florida. 116
The Army points with pride to its record of protecting
habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker, a listed species, on
several of its installations in the Southeast, none with designated
critical habitat. Working with the FWS, the Army has imple-
mented management plans for the woodpecker that impose some
restrictions on training, while reportedly allowing bird populations
to recover.1' 7 The Army has not shown that the same results could
not be achieved if critical habitat were designated on these
installations. 11
8
Perhaps most important, the Secretary of Defense has
always been able to direct the Endangered Species Committee
(colloquially known as the "God Squad") to grant an exemption for
a particular agency action "for reasons of national security." '119
Such an exemption has never been sought. In testimony before
Congress, the Army noted that while the FWS designated critical
habitat on fourteen of its installations, only two, Fort Lewis,
Washington, and Fort Irwin, California, were "critical to maintain-
ing the war-fighting readiness of the Army."120 Yet even they were
115 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-314, § 2811, 116 Stat. 2458, 2705-07 (2002).
116 DuBois Testimony, supra note 64, at 4.
117 Fatz, supra note 17, at 11. Training is restricted within 200 feet of nesting
cavity trees: bivouacking is reduced; no artillery fire, tear gas, smoke, or
incendiary devices are permitted; and there can be no digging of tank ditches or
fox holes. (These are pretty hardy birds!) Other restrictions on training to
accommodate listed species are described in Fiori, supra note 18, at 8-10.
118 Many additional examples of successful accommodations of ESA requirements
by various service branches are described in Programmatic Consultation with
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service at Camp Pendleton, California (n.d.),
available at http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Conservation/
Success/note6.html.
119 ESA § 7(j), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (2000).
120 Keane, supra note 87, at 4. FWS has reportedly proposed the designation of
critical habitat for 146 listed species in Hawaii that would affect seven Army
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not sufficiently critical to warrant invocation of the statutory
exemption.
3. Critical Mission Accomplished?
Because of strident objections from the environmental
community, the proposed changes to the ESA were stripped from
the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization bill at the last minute.
Learning from experience, DOD started its campaign earlier in the
legislative session the following year.121 The Fiscal Year 2004
Defense Authorization Act amended the ESA to prohibit the
Secretary of the Interior from designating as "critical habitat" any
area "subject to" an INRMP prepared under the Sikes Act, provided
that "the Secretary determines in writing that such plan provides
a benefit to the species for which critical habitat is proposed for
designation."122 There is no indication of how great a "benefit" must
be in order to justify the Secretary's determination. 123 The congres-
sional conferees indicated that "[t]his approach would allow for a
balance between military training requirements and protection of
endangered or threatened species, ' '124 although the Sikes Act for-
bids any balancing that would compromise the military mission of
an installation. 25 Moreover, both the adoption of an INRMP and
training facilities. Fatz, supra note 17, at 7.
121 See Memorandum from Paul W. Mayberry, supra note 3.
122 Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318(a)(3), 117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(B)(i)). The statutory changes are analyzed in BALDWIN, supra
note 69, at 19-20.
123 The amendment may offer far less protection than the FWS policy it replaces,
because the latter provided that in order to avoid designation of critical habitat,
an INRMP also had to include assurances that conservation management
strategies would be effective and would be implemented. See Final Designation
of Critical Habitat for Holocarpha Macradenia, supra note 100, at 63,974. But
see DEP'T OF DEF. ETAL., DRAFT INRMP COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN
4 (2004), available at http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Library/NCR/Docu
ments[DRAFT-INRMP-Strat-Plan-082004.pdf (indicating that in order to avoid
''crippling lawsuits," installation commanders should ensure that plans are
adequately funded to achieve management goals and objectives).
124 H.R. Rep. No. 108-354, at 668 (2003).
125 16 U.S.C. § 670a(b)(1)(I).
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the Secretary's determination of "benefit" appear to involve the
exercise of very broad administrative discretion that may be
difficult to challenge in court. For lands not covered by an INRMP,
the amendment also provides that the Secretary must consider
"the impact on national security" before she may designate new
critical habitat.
126
The 2003 amendment declares that nothing in it "affects the
requirement to consult under section 7(a)(2) with respect to an
agency action."'127 Section 7(a)(2) states that each federal agency,
"in consultation with[,] and with the assistance of the Secretary [of
the Interior]," must insure that any agency action "is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica-
tion" of designated critical habitat. 12 The related processes of
consultation and possible biological assessment continue to offer
important protections wherever a listed species may be present.'2 9
Moreover, the assurance required by section 7(a)(2) will apply in
the future to critical habitat designated before enactment of the
2003 amendment. 30 Nevertheless, failure to designate additional
126 Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318(b), 117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)).
127 Id. § 318(a)(3), 117 Stat. 1433 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(B)(ii)).
128 ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
129 ESA §§ 7(b), (c), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b), (c) (2000) (enumerating the statutory
requirements for consultation and assessment).
130 See H.R. Rep. No. 108-106, at 308 (2003). According to the House Report,
[t]his section would not annul existing critical habitat
designations, but it would permit the Secretary of the Interior
to exercise discretion to revise existing critical habitat
designations on military installations. No existing critical
habitat can be revised, however, if such action would result in
the extinction of an endangered or threatened species.
Id.
It is unclear just how broad the Secretary's discretion is in making such
revisions. Presumably, the Secretary could not eliminate a critical habitat
designation simply by initiating the revision process and then immediately
invoking the 2003 amendment to declare that critical habitat designation was
not permitted because of the existence of an INRMP.
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critical habitat on lands covered by INRMPs will reduce
protections for listed species.
1 3 1
The amendment also specifies that DOD must comply with
"section 9, including the prohibition preventing extinction and
taking of endangered species and threatened species."' 131 "Take" is
defined by regulation to include an act of "significant habitat
modification or degradation [that] actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding or sheltering."' 13 3 The take prohibition in section
9 is more protective than section 7 in one sense, because it may
cover habitat not designated as "critical." Section 9 applies not only
to activities that actually kill or injure wildlife,' but also to those
that are "reasonably certain" to "significantly impair[] their
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, and
sheltering," when such impairment is "imminent.,,13' Thus, even
after the 2003 amendment, if an activity is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of a listed species, threaten existing desig-
nated critical habitat, or constitute a take, the DOD will have to
obtain an exemption from the "God Squad" before going forward.
The amendments have already been put into operation. 136 A
proposed rule in late 2004, for example, would exclude areas of the
131 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 443 (5th Cir.
2001). The court made it clear that the bar to "adverse modification" of
designated critical habitat does not achieve the same results as the "jeopardy"
limitation in ESA § 7; see also Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Congress said that 'destruction or
adverse modification' could occur when sufficient critical habitat is lost so as to
threaten a species' recovery even if there remains sufficient habitat for the
species' survival.").
132 Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318(a)(3), 117 Stat. 1433 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1533(a)(3)(B)(iii)).
133 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2004).
134 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
691 n.2, 696 n.9 (1995).
131 Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 787-88 (9th
Cir. 1995).136 See, e.g., Memorandum from Alex A. Beehler, Asst. Deputy Undersec'y of Def.
for Env't, Safety, and Occupational Health to Deputy Asst. Sec'y of the Army et
al., Implementation of Sikes Act Improvement Act Amendments: Supplemental
Guidance Concerning INRMP Reviews (Nov. 1, 2004).
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Miramar Marine Air Station from designation as critical habitat
for an endangered plant called Spreading Navarretia. The grounds
for this exclusion are that the base is covered by an INRMP which
includes measures that "benefit" the species: education of base
personnel, "proactive" steps to avoid accidental impacts, and a
running inventory of locations where the plant is found.137 In
another example, the Secretary of the Interior declined to desig-
nate critical habitat for the Western Snowy Plover at two other
California bases, determining that "after taking into account the
impact on national security, the benefit of excluding these units
outweighs the benefit of including them."138
It is impossible to say precisely what the environmental
impact of these changes will be. They will provide some measure
of relief for DOD from the consultation and insurance provisions
of section 7 that otherwise would protect newly designated critical
habitat from "destruction or adverse modification." Yet, however
great the immediate need to facilitate readiness in the wake of
September 11th, the amendments to the ESA, unlike those to the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, apply not only to training and weapons
testing, but to all kinds of activities that might threaten endan-
gered species at every military base in the country.
C. Marine Mammal Protection Act
1. Osama's Submarine?
If the Soviet submarine described in Tom Clancy's book The
Hunt for Red October no longer worries U.S. military planners, a
new undersea threat has emerged with the development of ultra-
quiet diesel-electric subs by China, Iran, and North Korea. This
development adds urgency to planning for deployment of a
137 Proposed Rules: Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed
Designation of Critical Habitat for Navarretia fossalis (spreading navarretia),
69 Fed. Reg. 60,110-21 (Oct. 7, 2004).
131 Proposed Rules: Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed
Designation of Critical Habitat for the Pacific Coast Population of the Western
Snowy Plover, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,608, 75,633 (Dec. 17, 2004).
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powerful new generation of active sonar equipment called Surveil-
lance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active
("SURTASS LFA").' 39 The new system is needed, according to the
Navy, to allow detection of the quiet submarines outside the range
from which they could launch missiles at U.S. forces or territory.140
The new device sends out intense low-frequency sonar pulses
at a level of 215 decibels ("dB") underwater.1 ' In air, that is the
equivalent of a nearby jet engine or a gun muzzle blast.'4 2 Even
brief, unprotected exposure causes pain and may result in rup-
tured eardrums in humans.'43 The signals may travel great
139 See generally Dep't of the Navy, SURTASS LFA- Highlights (n.d.), http://
www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/Highlights/index.htm#pg5 (introducing the system and
suggesting that it poses only a minor risk to marine life). The new system
operates at frequencies of between 100-500 Hz. See Taking Marine Mammals
Incidental to Navy Operations of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low
Frequency Active Sonar, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,712-13 (July 16, 2002) [hereinafter
Taking Marine Mammals].
140 See Dep't of the Navy, SURTASS LFA- Why the United States Needs
SURTASS LFA (n.d.), http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/WhyNeed/index.htm. The
system is described and evaluated in GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE
ACQUISITIONS: TESTING NEEDED TO PROVE SURTASS/LFA EFFECTIVENESS IN
LITTORAL WATERS (GAO-02-692) (June 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02692.pdf.
141 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans (Evans 1), 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1033
(N.D. Cal. 2002). Transmissions may continue for between six and one-hundred
seconds, but not for more than twenty percent of the time. See Taking Marine
Mammals, supra note 139, 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,712-13; see also EARTH ISLAND
INST., FACT SHEET: HOW LOUD IS THE NAVY'S LFAISURTASS SONAR SYSTEM
(n.d.), available at http://www.earthisland.org/immp/oceannoise/docs/eii-sonar_
factsheet.pdf (comparing sound levels in air and underwater); EARTH ISLAND
INST., CHART OF COMPARABLE AIRBORNE AND UNDERWATER NOISE SOURCES (n.d.),
available at http://www.earthisland.org/immp/oceannoise/docs/eii-sonarchart.
pdf ; NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, SOUNDING THE DEPTHS: SUPERTANKERS,
SONAR, AND THE RISE OF UNDERSEA NOISE (1999), available at http://www.nrdc.
org/wildlife/marine/sound/sdinx.asp [hereinafter SOUNDING THE DEPTHS].
142 Am. Acad. of Otolaryngology, Noise, Ears, and Hearing Protection (1995),
http://www.entnet.org/healthinfo/hearing/noise-hearing.cfm.
'
43 Id. at 2; see also MELCHOR J. ANTUNANO & JAMES P. SPANYERS, PILOT SAFETY
BROCHURE: HEARING AND NOISE IN AVIATION (2002), available at http://www.faa.
gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/mediahearingirochure.pdf. The Navy
has restricted operation of SURTASS LFA sonar in the vicinity of recreational
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distances, registering as much as 165 dB at 40 nautical miles from
the source and 140 dB at 400 nautical miles.
144
The operation of other powerful sonars has been associated
with devastating injuries to marine mammals. A study by the U.S.
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") and the Navy
determined that a mid-frequency sonar system caused inner-ear
bleeding and disorientation in whales leading to their mass
stranding during a Navy exercise off the Bahamas in 2000.145
Similar episodes have been reported, although not so extensively
studied, off the coasts of Washington State, Greece, the Canary
Islands, the Bahamas, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Japan, and
elsewhere. 146 In a study of the "recent spate of whale-beaching
events which have been linked to sonar exercises," the Pentagon's
JASON scientific advisory group reported that "the evidence of
sonar causation is, in our opinion, completely convincing.'
47
and commercial divers to 145 dB, the equivalent of about 85 dB in air, a level at
which voice communication is impractical. See Dep't of the Navy, SURTASS LFA-
Diver Studies (n.d.), http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/DiverStudies/index.htm.
144 Evans I, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1021, 1034.
115 NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN & SEC'Y OF THE NAVY, JOINT INTERIM
REPORT, BAHAMAS MARINE MAMMAL STRANDING EVENT OF 15-16 MARCH 2000
(2001), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/protres/overview/Interim_
BahamasReport.pdf. A summary of the event may be found at Interim Findings
on the Stranding of Beaked Whales in the Bahamas (Dec. 20, 2001), at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/bahamasbeakedwhales.htm; see also P.D. Jepson et
al., Gas-Bubble Lesions in Stranded Cetaceans, NATURE, Oct. 9, 2003, at 575
(reporting the effects of NATO sonar exercises in the Canary Islands).
146 See Letter from Joel Reynolds, Natural Res. Def. Council, et al., to Gordon R.
England, Sec'y of the Navy (July 14, 2004), at 3-7, available at http://www.
nrdc.org/media/docs/040714.pdf (providing a detailed listing of various strand-
ings); see also William Rossiter, Sonar and Seismic Noise, WHALES ALIVE!, Apr.
2005, available at http://csiwhalesalive.org/csi05205.html; Betsy Carpenter,
Sound and Fury, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 2002 at 50; Kenneth R.
Weiss, Researchers Probe Whether Sonar Caused Deaths of Whales, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2002, at A2; SOUNDING THE DEPTHS, supra note 141.
"' H. Levine, JASON, The Mitre Corp., Active Sonar Waveform, June 2004, at 1,
3, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/sonar.pdf. Cf. NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, OCEAN NOISE AND MARINE MAMMALS 6-7 (2003).
Because of the repeated associations in time and location of the
strandings and sonar in military exercises, the correlation
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In August 2004, the Scientific Committee of the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission reported finding "compelling evidence
implicating military sonar" as having "a direct impact on beaked
whales in particular."'48 In October 2004, the European Parliament
adopted a resolution calling on its 25 member states to stop the
deployment of high-intensity active sonar systems. 4 9 In response
to these developments, the Bush administration reportedly has put
together a new policy that "strongly opposes any international
regulatory framework addressing military use of active sonar
because of the potential to restrict the ability of individual States
to balance the relevant security and environmental interests."'5 °
The Marine Mammal Protection Act ('MMPA")'5 prohibits
the "taking" of marine mammals, with certain exceptions. 152 "Take"
is generally defined to include "harassment," which means "any
act of pursuit, torment, or annoyance" that
between sonars and the strandings is compelling, but that
association is not synonymous with a causal mechanism for the
deaths of the stranded animals. The cause of death in all cases
was attributed to hyperthermia, but a precise cause for the
unusual traumas that were also seen in the cases examined has
not yet been determined.
Id.
148 INT'L WHALING COMM'N, REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE 44 (2004),
available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/scicom/SCRepFiles2004/56SC
rep.pdf.
149 Resolution on the Environmental Effects of High-Intensity Active Naval
Sonars, EUR. PARL. DOC., Oct. 28,2004, available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/
omklsipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2004-0047+O+DO C+XML+V
O//EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=X; Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, European
Parliament Calls for Halt to High Intensity Naval Sonar Use (Oct. 28, 2004),
available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/041028a.asp. Similar
international expressions of concern are described in Press Release, Natural Res.
Def. Council, International Agreement Calls on Member States to Curb Military
Sonar and Other Noise Technology (Nov. 11, 2004), available at http://www.
nrdc. org/media/pressreleases/041111.asp.
"' Marc Kaufman, U.S. Set to Oppose Efforts to Restrict Use of Sonar, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2005, at A05.
151 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(h) (2000).
152 Id. § 1371(a)(3). The MMPA and its application to the Navy generally are
described in Kiamos, supra note 89, at 462-88.
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(i) has the potential to injure a marine mammal or
marine mammal stock in the wild; or
(ii) has the potential to disturb a marine mammal or
marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disrup-
tion of behavioral patterns, including but not limited
to, migration, breathing, nursing, breeding, feeding,
or sheltering.'53
The NMFS may authorize the "incidental, but not intentional,
taking" of "small numbers" of animals within a "specified geo-
graphical region" for up to five years if it will have only a "negligi-
ble impact on [the] species or stock,"'54 or it may authorize the
incidental "taking by harassment" for up to one year under similar
limitations.'5 5
Despite its study of whale strandings in the Bahamas, in
2002, NMFS authorized one-year incidental take permits for
"training, testing, and routine military operations" of the new
sonar system by the Navy in seventy to seventy-five percent of the
world's oceans. 5 ' NMFS found that SURTASS LFA would have a
"negligible impact" on marine mammals. NMFS reasoned that
data on injuries from high and mid-level sonars are not necessarily
relevant to the impact of the low-frequency system, about which
fewer data exist.'57 The permits would have allowed a take of up to
twelve percent of any particular species or population stock.15
Impacts were to be minimized by visual as well as active and
passive sonar searches near the source ship to ensure that no
153 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18)(A) (2000).
154 Id. § 1371(a)(5)(A).
'
55 Id. § 1371(a)(5)(D).
156 Taking Marine Mammals, supra note 139, 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,761.
157 Id., 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,723-24; Dep't of the Navy, SURTASS LFA: Scientific
Research (n.d.), http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/Research/index.htm (summariz-
ing studies conducted by the Navy on the impacts of SURTASS LFA). But cf.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans (Evans 1), 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014-17
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (describing intense controversy over this point); Taking Marine
Mammals, supra note 139.
158 Taking Marine Mammals, supra note 139; 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,780.
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marine mammals were present before the new system was
activated, and by avoiding its use in most instances near shore and
in other specified areas where marine mammals were likely to be
most abundant.159
In late 2002, a federal district court in California found that
such a large percentage violated the "small numbers" limitation and
that the impact might be more than merely "negligible.""16 The court
also rejected, in part, NMFS's reading of the term "harassment,"
which NFMS interpreted to mean activity producing an "actual"
behavioral response, "rather than merely a potential for disrup-
tion." '161 While the court recognized "the importance of this new sonar
technology to national security,' 6 2 the court approved a negotiated
preliminary injunction that restricted its use to a one million-square
mile area of the Western Pacific around the Marianas Islands where
marine mammal populations were thought to be relatively small.'63
In 2003, the same court determined that the planned
operation of the sonar system would indeed violate the MMPA's
requirements that an incidental take permit be limited to a
specified geographical region, affect only small numbers, and have
'5 9 Id., 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,780-81; Dep't of the Navy, SURTASS LFA" Preventive
Measures (n.d.), http://www.surtass-fa-eis.comMeasures/index.htm (describing
the Navy's avoidance strategy in detail).
160 Evans I, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1023-27, 1032-33. See Carolyn M. Chopko, Case
Note, NRDC v. Evans: Northen District of California Delivers "Sound"Judgment
in Protection of Marine Wildlife Under the MMPA, Restricting Navy's Use of
Sonar, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 393 (2004); Daniel Inkelas, Note, Security, Sound,
and Cetaceans: Legal Challenges to Low Frequency Active Sonar Under U.S. and
International Environmental Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 207, 226-41
(2005); Colleen C. Karpinsky, Comment, A Whale of a Tale: The Sea of
Controversy Surrounding the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the U.S.
Navy's Proposed Use of the SURTASS-LFA Sonar System, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 389 (2004); Julie G. Yap, Note, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding
Environmental Stewardship Out of the Riptide of National Security, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1289 (2004).
161 Evans I, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1027-31. The court found probable violations of
the Endangered Species Act and NEPA, as well. Id.
162 Id. at 1013.
163 Id. at 1054-55; see also Stipulation and Order re: Preliminary Injunction in
Evans I (No. C-02-3805-EDL).
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only a negligible impact on marine mammals.' The court ordered
the Navy to negotiate with environmental plaintiffs on terms of a
permanent injunction to establish the timing, location, and other
protocols for testing and training with the new sonar.165 The court
said it believed that "the public interest in both military prepared-
ness and protection of marine life can be reconciled through a
carefully tailored injunction that allows the Navy to meet its needs
for peacetime training and testing, while also providing reasonable
safeguards for marine mammals and other sea animals."'66 Thus,
the court directed a halt to operations in most coastal zones and
open ocean areas with features that support concentrations of
marine mammals, taking into account seasonal migrations and
breeding. In reaching its decision, the court dismissed expert
testimony suggesting that the threat from new enemy submarines
was exaggerated, saying it would not "second guess the Navy's
determination within its expertise that it needs to test and train
with LFA sonar in a variety of oceanic conditions."'67 The resulting
agreement restricts use of the sonar to the western Pacific, off the
coasts of China, North Korea, Japan, and the Phillippines. 6 s
The court declared that "only peacetime use of this new
sonar system is at issue; the Navy is free to use the system without
restriction in time of war or heightened threat."'6 9 It is true that in
its final rule authorizing the issuance of incidental take permits,
the NMFS took pains to note that the Navy had not applied for a
permit to cover the sonar's use at such times, and that in any event
"the timing of such events is speculative and outside the control of
164 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans (Evans 11), 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142-53,
1158-59 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
165 Id. at 1192.
166 Id. at 1139.
167 Id. at 1190.
168 See Stipulation Regarding Permanent Injunction in Evans H(No. C-02-3805-
EDL); Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Navy Agrees to Limit Global
Sonar Deployment (Oct. 13, 2003), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/
pressreleases/031013.asp. The testing area is currently being renegotiated
according to the terms of the agreement. Telephone interview with Joel R.
Reynolds, Natural Res. Def. Council (Apr. 13, 2005).
169 Evans II, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
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the U.S. Navy."' 7 ° The MMPA contains no exception for wars or
emergencies, however. Even if it did, the court's declaration could
create uncertainty about when the negotiated settlement will
apply, since the President described the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, as "acts of war," '171 and Congress approved the
use of military force against Afghanistan and Iraq on September
18, 2001,172 and October 16, 2002,17' respectively.
2. Willy on Capitol Hill?
In the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Authorization Act, Congress
dramatically narrowed the definition of "harassment" in the
MMPA for "military readiness activities" to cover only (1) acts that
actually injure or have a significant potential to injure marine
mammals-mere potential to injure would not suffice-and (2) acts
that actually disturb or are likely to disturb to such a degree that
behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly altered. 174 The
170 Taking Marine Mammals, supra note 139, 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,717. A challenge
to the use of SURTASS LFA during wartime or heightened threat conditions, as
a violation of MMPA, ESA, and NEPA, was dismissed on standing grounds in
Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004).
171 Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Remarks by the President in Photo
Opportunity with the National Security Team, Sept. 12, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html.
172 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
173 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
174 Nat'l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, §
319(a), 117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18)).
(i) any act that injures or has the significant potential to injure
a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild; or
(ii) any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine mammal
or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of
natural behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to,
migration, surfacing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering,
to a point where such behavioral patterns are abandoned or
significantly altered.
Id. (emphasis added).
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amendment also authorized incidental take permits for military
readiness activities without specifying a "geographical region" or
limiting the take to "small numbers." '175 The changes seem tailor-
made to cover the LFA case; however, their application is not
confined to testing of the new sonar system. The new definition is
broad enough to encompass almost everything the Navy does at
sea. The 2003 amendment also makes it more difficult for members
of the public to learn about or challenge the issuance of incidental
take permits for military readiness activities. The earlier require-
ments of advance publicity in local newspapers and electronic
media, and opportunity for public comment, were eliminated. 176
Finally, the amendment allows the Secretary of Defense to exempt
any action or category of actions from compliance with the MMPA
for up to two years if he determines that it is "necessary for
national defense, ''177 which brings the Act into line with most other
federal environmental laws.
The NMFS recently determined that training and testing
operations with LFA sonar constitute a "military readiness
activity" within the meaning of the 2003 amendment, and
amended its regulations to allow the unintentional incidental take
of marine mammals during such operations.7 7 NFMS also issued
letters of authorization approving those operations in the Pacific,
175 Id. at § 319(c), 117 Stat. at 1435 (2000) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)
(2000)). In addition, the amendment altered the existing mitigation requirement
that incidental take permits should have the "least practicable adverse impact
on such species or stock and its habitat, paying particular attention to rookeries,
mating grounds, and areas of similar significance, and on the availability of such
species or stock for subsistence uses," 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5) (2000), to provide
that the determination of that impact must include consideration of the
"effectiveness of the military readiness activity." Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 319(c),
117 Stat. at 1435 (2000). The amendment does not, however, indicate how the
two concerns are to be balanced.
176 Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 319(c), 117 Stat. at 1435 (2000).
177 Id. § 319(b), 117 Stat. at 1434 (adding 16 U.S.C. § 1371(o).
178 See Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Unified
Agenda: Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Navy Operation, 69 Fed. Reg.
73,029, 73,035 (Dec. 13, 2004) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. at pt. 216); see also
Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., 69 Fed. Reg. 38,873
(June 29, 2004).
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albeit within the bounds of the negotiated agreement described
above.179 The amendment has been invoked in connection with
activities not related to Navy sonar. For example, the amendment
was used in a proposal to allow the Air Force to harass marine
mammals in its testing of air-to-surface weapons in the Gulf of
Mexico. is°
It is difficult to say whether these statutory changes were
needed to keep the nation safe. An informed evaluation would
require more information about the threat from enemy diesel-
electric submarines, the defense capabilities of the SURTASS LFA
system,"1 the effects of the sonar on marine mammals, and the
availability of possible alternatives." 2 A recent study commis-
sioned by the Office of Naval Research concluded that a "better
understanding of the mechanisms at work will enable a serious
risk-assessment to be done in conjunction with future sonar use
and will enable a serious discussion among differing parties as to
the trade-off between military readiness and marine mammal
protection."' 3 The study suggested less destructive patterns for
operating active sonar systems. 84 Others have suggested that
passive sonar systems and other technical means may protect the
179 Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Notices: Taking
and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Navy
Operations of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active
Sonar, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,997 (Aug. 24, 2004).
180 Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Notices: Taking
and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to
Conducting the Precision Strike Weapon (PSW) Testing and Training by Eglin
Air Force Base in the Gulf of Mexico, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,816 (Apr. 22, 2004).
181 See Declaration of Theodore A. Postol in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans (Evans II), 279 F.
Supp. 2d 1129, 1190-92 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that the Navy has exagger-
ated both the threat from enemy submarines and the ability of SURTASS LFA
to counter that threat).
112 The amendments are analyzed and criticized in NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
WRITTEN STATEMENT ON PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION
ACT OF 1972 (2003), available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/cmmpa
0303.asp; Inkelas, supra note 160, at 241-44.
183 Levine, supra note 147, at 3.
184 Id. at 26-27, 42.
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nation as well as SURTASS LFA.8 5 Another possible alternative
is the elimination of the new enemy submarines. There is ample
precedent for the prohibition of entire classes of especially
threatening or destructive weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, for example, prohibits the development of nuclear weapons
by nations that do not already possess them."8 6 The Treaty on
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces required the dismantling of a
whole class of missiles in Europe whose use could have led to a
major nuclear war. 8 7 In addition, in the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention nations agreed to an intrusive inspection regime to
ensure the elimination of these inhumane weapons.' The United
States apparently has not explored the possibility of such a
multilateral agreement concerning submarines. With imagination
and genuine resolve, such an agreement might be reached.
The environmental sacrifices authorized by these amend-
ments to the MMPA are potentially vast and irreversible, includ-
ing the extirpation of entire populations of some marine mammals.
The Pentagon has not yet made a compelling case that such
sacrifices are necessary to keep the nation secure.
D. RCRA and CERCLA
Immense quantities of explosives, heavy metals, chemical
warfare agents, and depleted uranium have been deposited by
bullets, mortar and artillery shells, grenades, flares, rockets, and
bombs in live-fire training and testing at military facilities around
185 See, e.g., Safe Alternatives to Active Sonar That Are in Use or Development by
the US Navy Now (n.d.), http://www.earthisland.org/project/genPage2.cfm?
generalID=193&pagelD=196&subSiteID=51.
116 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (opened for signature on July 1, 1986).
187 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 40.
18 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and
Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800.
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the country.'89 Neighbors worry that with the accumulation of
these materials over time, some hazardous components may
migrate off-range by leaching into surface and ground waters or
becoming airborne. 190 In 1997, EPA Region I acted under the Safe
Drinking Water Act to shut down live-fire training at Camp
Edwards, part of the Massachusetts Military Reservation on Cape
Cod, after unexploded ordnance and munitions were found to have
contaminated the sole source aquifer for the Upper Cape.' 9'
One contaminant in particular that has attracted wide-
spread public concern is perchlorate, which has been found at
elevated levels in the drinking water supplies of more than eleven
million people in thirty-five states.'92 The presence of perchlorate
in the environment is associated primarily with its use as an
oxidizer in solid rocket fuels and propellants, as well as in
explosives.' 9 Perchlorate is an iodine uptake inhibitor that can
impair thyroid function and perhaps cause cancer, and it is
thought to be especially threatening to fetuses, newborns, and
"' At the end of fiscal year 2003, DOD reported unexploded ordnance, military
munitions, or munitions components awaiting removal at 2,817 active and closed
facilities around the country. Defense Environmental Restoration Program:
Annual Report to Congress-Fiscal Year 2003 (n.d.), at 17, at http://63.88.245.60/
DERPARCFY03/PDFS/FY03_Report/dod-ch.pdf.
19 o See generally Envtl. Prot. Agency, Military Munitions / Unexploded Ordnance
(2004), available at http://epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/munitions.htm; see also
Lenny Siegel, Ctr. for Pub. Envtl. Oversight, A Stakeholder's Guide to Munitions
Response (2004), available at http://cpeo.org/pubs/cpeo-stakeholdersuxo_
guide.doc.
191 See Military Toxics Project, Communities in the Line of Fire: The
Environmental, Cultural, and Human Health Impacts of Military Munitions and
Firing Ranges (2002), available at http://www.miltoxproj.org/cm-report.htm#
Massachusetts%20Military%2OReservation; Envtl. Prot. Agency, Massachusetts
Military Reservation (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/regionl/mmr/;
Joshua E. Latham, The Military Munitions Rule and Environmental Regulation
of Munitions, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 467, 512-16 (2000).
192 See generally COMM. TO ASSESS THE HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF PERCHLORATE
INGESTION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCILOFTHE NATIONALACADEMIES, HEALTH
IMPLICATIONS OF PERCHLORATE INGESTION (2005), available at http://www.nap.
edu/catalog/1 1202.html.
193 Id. at 15.
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young children."' The results of studies by the EPA'95 and more
recently the National Academy of Sciences'96 have been controver-
sial, and the EPA still has not set national drinking water
standards for the substance.1"7 DOD reportedly maintains that
without either national or state standards, it cannot be required to
sample for perchlorate contamination on its operational ranges. 9 '
A Keystone Center report recommended in 2000 that DOD
"implement periodic clearance, or if possible, a 'clear-as-you-go'
policy. Such an approach may serve both to reduce the cost and
complexity of any clearance and cleanup required to allow other
uses, and ultimately prevent condemning land as a national
sacrifice zone."' 99 The Defense Department has not, however, fully
embraced either the Keystone Center's recommendation or its
objectives, and DOD does not appear to be totally committed to
protection of the environment around military facilities. The Air
194 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERCHLORATE AND PERCHLORATE SALTS (2005),
available at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/1007.htm.
195 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEv., NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERCHLORATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION:
TOXICOLOGICAL REVIEW AND RISK CHARACTERIZATION (2002), available at
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfmlrecordisplay.cfm?deid=24002.
19 6 HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF PERCHLORATE INGESTION, supra note 192.
197 EPA has recently set an "official reference dose" for perchlorate. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, EPA Sets Reference Dose for Perchlorate, Feb. 18, 2005, available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/b lab9f485b098972852562e7004dc68
6/cla57d2077c4bfda85256fac005b8b32!OpenDocument.
19' See Ctr. for Pub. Envtl. Oversight, DOD Exemptions Links: CPEO's Analysis
(n.d.), http://www.cpeo.org/dodexemptions/cpeo an.html. The Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2005 contains a "sense of Congress" provision urging, but not
requiring, the Secretary of Defense to plan for the remediation of perchlorate
contamination resulting from DOD activities once a national drinking water
standard is adopted, develop a plan for cleanup in the absence of such a
standard if the Secretary finds a "hazard to human health," continue evaluation
and prioritization of contaminated sites without waiting for a standard, and
continue remediation where perchlorate contamination poses an "imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health and welfare." Ronald Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375,
§ 318, 118 Stat. 1811, 1845 (2004).
199 KEYSTONE CTR., NATIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE ON MILITARY MUNITIONS 10
(Sept. 2000), available at http://www.keystone.org/FINALMUNITIONS.PDF.
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Force reports that it clears unexploded ordnance and munitions
("UXO") residue from its active ranges at regular intervals in order
to extend their useful lives.20 ° Current DOD policy generally states
only that ranges and operating areas "shall be managed and
operated to support their long-term viability and utility to meet
the National defense mission,""2 1 and it requires the military to
"minimize both potential explosives hazards and harmful environ-
mental impacts."2 °2 A Pentagon official recently reported that "we
are actively developing ways to minimize the amount of UXO on
our operational test and training ranges. The Department is
developing policies on the periodic clearance of UXO for personnel
safety and to ensure [that] chemical constituents do not contami-
nate groundwater.""2 3
20 See Hearings Before the Readiness Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed
Forces,, 108th Cong., at 9 (2003) (statement of Gen. Robert H. Foglesong, U.S. Air
Force Vice Chief of Staff), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/
statemnt/2003/March/Foglesong.pdf; see also National Defense Authorization Act
for FY 2004: Hearing on S. 747 Before the Subcomm. on Readiness and Mgmt.
Support of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Lenny Siegel, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Pub. Envtl. Oversight), available at http://
www.cpeo.org/pubs/testimony-siegel-s.html. By contrast,
Army installations are required to periodically clear operational
ranges of military munitions (i.e., UXO and munitions debris)
and other range-related debris to allow safe access to range
areas for range maintenance, modernization, training, or testing
operations; preclude accumulation of used military munitions
(e.g., UXO) and other range-related debris that would impair or
prohibit the continued use of the range for its intended purpose;
or facilitate reasonably anticipated future land uses if all or a
portion of the range has a finite end-use date (e.g., as stipulated
in a lease agreement, land withdrawal language, or other land
use agreement).
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 22, at 47.
201 DOD Dir. No. 3200.15, Sustainment of Ranges and Operating Areas 4.1
(Jan. 10, 2003).
202 DOD Dir. No. 4715.11, Environmental and Explosives Safety Management on
Operational Ranges Within the United States 4.5 (May 10, 2004).
203 Defense-Wide and Air Force Budget Overviews: Hearing Before the Military
Constr. Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Raymond F. DuBois, Deputy Undersec'y of Def., for Installations
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In 1992, the Federal Facility Compliance Act2 °4 directed
EPA to adopt regulations that identify when military munitions
become hazardous waste subject to cradle-to-grave regulation
under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA")2 °5 and provide for the safe storage and transportation of
that waste.2 °6 In 1997, EPA responded with its Military Munitions
Rule ('"IMR"),20 7 declaring, inter alia, that a military munition is
not a "solid waste" subject to regulation when it is "used for its
intended purpose, which includes when a munition is used for the
training of military personnel ... [or] for research, development,
testing, and evaluation. 202 Thus, according to EPA, the firing of
munitions on an operational range "does not constitute a waste
management activity because the munitions are not 'discarded.'
Rather, the firing of munitions is within the normal and expected
use of the product., 20 9 As long as fired munitions remain on or in
the ground where they land within an operational range, the MMR
provides that they are not solid waste. This means that regulators,
both state and federal, may not invoke RCRA to require DOD to
clean up such munitions.210
It is difficult to imagine that DOD's "intended purpose" is to
allow such materials to remain on range, exposed to the elements
and Env't), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/Library/Congress/
2004 hr/040330-dubois.htm.
204 Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505
(1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
Federal Facility Compliance Act].
205 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39(e) (2000 &
Supp. II 2002). The common reference to "Subtitle C" is to Subchapter III in the
statute as codified.
206 Federal Facility Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 107, 106 Stat. 1505,
1513 (adding RCRA § 3004(y), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(y)).
207 Military Munitions Rule: Hazardous Waste Identification and Management;
Explosives Emergencies; Manifest Exemption for Transport of Hazardous Waste
on Rights-of-Way on Contiguous Properties; Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 6621 (Feb.
12, 1997) (codified in 40 C.F.R. beginning at pt. 260).
208 Id., 62 Fed. Reg. at 6628.
209 Id., 62 Fed. Reg. at 6630.
210 See Latham, supra note 191, at 479-512 (analyzing the MMR).
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for a long period of time, and eventually to be dispersed into the
environment. Such a conclusion is plainly inconsistent with another
part of the MMVR, which specifies that if munitions fall off range
and are not immediately cleaned up, or there is no record of their
location, they are statutory solid waste subject to RCRA corrective
action.211 The theory in the latter case is that "a failure to render
safe and retrieve" such a munition demonstrates an "intent to
discard" it.212 The fact that ordnance falls six inches on one side of
a property boundary rather than the other does not, of course,
change the threat it poses to public health and the environment.
When the MMR was challenged as "arbitrary and capri-
cious," it was upheld by a federal appellate court in 1998.213 The
court ignored the reasoning of a different federal appeals court
case decided five years earlier involving lead shot that had
accumulated on the grounds of a recreational firing range.214 EPA,
as amicus curiae, argued, and the court agreed, that if the shot did
not become solid waste the moment it hit the ground, it would be
regarded as "discarded" and therefore would satisfy the statutory
definition of solid waste when it had been "left to accumulate long
after" serving its "intended purpose.' '215
In 2001, environmental plaintiffs invoked one of RCRA's
"imminent and substantial endangerment" provisions, 16 which are
not covered by the MMR,217 in an effort to abate the discharge of
ordnance at the Navy's Vieques Island range.21' The court cited the
211 Military Munitions Rule, supra note 207, 62 Fed. Reg. at 6655 (codified at 40
C.F.R. § 266.202(d)).
212 Id.; see also 62 Fed. Reg. at 6632.
213 Military Toxics Project v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 146 F.3d 948,955 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
214 Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Assoc. v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305 (2d
Cir. 1993).
215 Id. at 1316.
216 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972-73 (2000).
217 The MMR only applies to activities that, but for the MMR, would be subject
to regulation under Subtitle C of the statute. The "imminent and substantial
endangerment" provision is found in Subtitle G of RCRA.
218 See Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 152 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.P.R.
2001).
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EPA's reasoning in the MVMR, holding that munitions were not
"discarded" and therefore did not constitute solid waste at the
moment they hit the ground.219 The court nevertheless refused to
dismiss a claim that "ordnance debris and unexploded ordnance
left to accumulate ... constitute solid waste. 22°
The Defense Department worries that the "imminent and
substantial endangerment" provision could be used to interrupt
essential live-fire training and testing on its ranges.22 ' It also fears
the enforcement of a different RCRA provision that requires federal
agencies engaged in activities that may result in the "disposal or
management of solid waste or hazardous waste" to comply with
state and local rules, both substantive and procedural, for handling
such wastes.222 The Pentagon is also concerned about possible suits
by the EPA, states, or environmental plaintiffs under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA")2 1 seeking the prompt cleanup of training ranges.224
As proof of its concern, DOD points to a suit filed in 2002 by
a coalition of public interest groups against the Army for alleged
RCRA and CERCLA violations at its Eagle River Flats firing range
at Fort Richardson, near Anchorage, Alaska.2" According to the
environmental plaintiffs, the Army's failure to clean up its spent
ordnance violated Alaska law and therefore violated RCRA's
requirement that federal agencies comply with state provisions for
219 Id. at 169.
220 Id. at 169 n.6.
221 See DuBois Testimony, supra note 64, at 8-9.
222 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (2000). This RCRA provision is also outside the ambit of
the MMR. See DuBois Testimony, supra note 64, at 8-9.
223 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000).
224 DuBois Testimony, supra note 64, at 8.
225 Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, No. A02-0083 CV
(D. Alaska June 26, 2002). The suit also alleged violations of the Clean Water
Act because of the discharge of munitions into waters without an NPDES
permit. The Army feared that a permit might not be available or might contain
unacceptable conditions. See ROUNDTABLE, supra note 25, at 6 ("Richardson is
really the key case that.., has focused our attention."); Fiori, supra note 18, at
12-13.
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management of solid and hazardous waste.26 The plaintiffs also
charged that the Army failed to perform the remedial investiga-
tion, feasability study, and remediation required by CERCLA.
227
Although the plaintiffs insisted that they had no desire to shut
down the firing range,228 the Army worried that an unfavorable
ruling in this suit would jeopardize the use of more than 400 firing
ranges around the country. 229 The suit was settled in 2004 after the
Army agreed, inter alia, to refrain from artillery firing during
spring and fall waterfowl migrations, to take special care not to
harm beluga whales, and to obtain a Clean Water Act permit for
its discharges of munitions.2" °
The Pentagon wants to amend both RCRA and CERCLA to
eliminate the statutory requirements that force them to clean up
military munitions or their hazardous constituents that remain on
the operational ranges" where they were fired.231 The Pentagon's
proposed amendments would redefine the term "solid waste" in
RCRA and the term "release" in CERCLA to exclude such muni-
tions.232 "Release," or the threat of a release, is the circumstance
226 Amended Complaint, Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics, supra note 225, at 10.
227 Id. at 12 (alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e)).
228 Telephone Interview with Peter VanTuyn, attorney for Trustees for Alaska,
May 22, 2003.
229 Fatz, supra note 17, at 4.
230 See Press Release, Military Toxics Proj., Plaintiff Groups Reach Critical
Agreement with Department of Defense to Protect Lands and Waters at Fort
Richardson, Alaska (Oct. 28, 2004), available at http://www.miltoxproj.org/
fortrich.htm.
231 Amendments to RCRA and CERCLA were included most recently in DOD's
proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, were sent to
Congress on April 7, 2005, and are available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/
docs/FY06NDAABillText.pdf.
232 Section 314 of the proposed legislation provided, in part:
(a) Definition of Solid Waste.-(1) The term "solid waste" as
used in the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended (42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 et seq.), does not include-
(A) military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or
(B) the constituents thereof, that are or have come to be located,
incident to their normal and expected use, on an operational
range, and remain thereon....
[Vol. 30:1
2005] OSAMA'S SUBMARINE
that triggers CERCLA authority to clean up a hazardous substance
in the environment.233 Existing requirements to clean up muni-
tions that land off an operational range and to clean up ranges
after they have closed would not change under the proposed
amendments. The EPA would have continuing authority to
respond immediately to munitions on range that pose an "immi-
nent and substantial endangerment" to health, to the environ-
ment, or to drinking water supplies under the Safe Drinking Water
Act2 34 or CERCLA,235 but not RCRA.2 36
Aside from these limited safeguards, munitions located on
an operational range would be placed beyond the reach of environ-
mental regulators, even if they produced a contaminant plume that
crossed the facility boundary. 23 7 The central aim of RCRA, to
(b) Definition of Release.-(1) The term "release" as used in the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.), does
not include the deposit or presence of any-
(A) military munitions, including unexploded ordnance, or
(B) the constituents thereof, that are or have come to be located,
incident to their normal and expected use, on an operational
range, and remain thereon....
The terms "military munitions," "operational range," and "unexploded ordnance"
are defined at 10 U.S.C.S. § 101(e) (LexisNexis 2005). An earlier, similar
proposal is broadly defended in William H. Hurd, Modest in Scope, Limited in
Effect, Balanced, ENVTL. FORUM, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 47.
233 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2000).
234 42 U.S.C. § 300i (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
235 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2000). More accurately, the President may direct the
Attorney General to act or may take other action to protect "public health or
welfare or the environment." Subpart (3) of the proposed amendment to
CERCLA preserves this right.
236 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (authorizing the EPA to respond to such a threat from "solid
waste or hazardous waste.") A waste is not considered "hazardous" under the
statute, however, unless it is a "solid waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
231 Impacts of the proposed changes on existing state and federal authorities are
spelled out in Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democrats, Fact Sheet: DOD
Exemptions from RCRA and CERCLA (n.d.), available at http://www.house.
gov/commercedemocrats/DODexemptions/factsheet.l.shtml. A DOD official
inaccurately testified before Congress that the proposed amendments would
limit regulation of munitions testing and training on operational ranges under
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prevent the release of contaminants into the environment, would
be completely frustrated. Moreover, DOD could establish or move
the boundaries of its operational ranges to avoid regulation, and
only DOD could determine when a range ceased to be "opera-
tional."238
The proposed statutory changes, DOD insists, would merely
codify existing practice.2 39 EPA has never required a RCRA correc-
tive action on an operational range, and CERCLA cleanups have
been ordered only when it was determined that the ordinance
"pose[d] an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment."240 Besides, the Pentagon points out (without even
a hint of irony), the changes would affect only about one percent of
the U.S. land mass,24' an area roughly equal to that of Indiana.
As recently as 2003, EPA did not favor the changes. EPA
"recognize[d] that it does have authority on active ranges through
various statutes," but insisted that it "has been judicious in the use
of that authority.242 EPA said it "will ensure appropriate consul-
tation with DOD leaders to minimize any disruption in military
RCRA and CERCLA "if and only if those munitions and their associated
constituents do not have the potential to migrate off of an operational range."
DuBois Testimony, supra note 64, at 5. The proposed amendments contain no
such qualification. The same official declared, "States and citizens exercising
RCRA authority under our RRPI RCRA provision addressing off-range migration
could potentially use that authority to enforce on-range measures necessary to
redress the migration where appropriate." Id. at 15. This statement is also not
supported by the language of the proposal.238 See 10 U. S.C.S. § 101 (e)(3)(B) (LexisNexis 2005) (defining "operational range"
as including a range that, "although not currently being used for range activities
... is still considered by the Secretary [of Defense] to be a range and has not
been put to a new use that is incompatible with range activities."). Applying this
definition, cleanup of a range could presumably be delayed indefinitely.
239 Fatz, supra note 17, at 5.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 7.
242 Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA's Comments on DOD's FY 04 Legislative Proposals
to the National Defense Authorization Act (n.d.), at 9, available at http://www.
peer.org/docs/epa/EPACommentsDODFY04Proposals.pdf [hereinafter EPA
Comments].
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readiness." '243 In EPA's view, the military's concerns were substan-
tially addressed in the 1997 RCRA Military Munitions Rule, which
"generally shields active ranges from RCRA Subtitle C regulation." '244
While both RCRA and CERCLA provide for renewable, one-
year presidential waivers on national security grounds,245 the
RCRA exemption has been used only twice, once in 1980246 and
again in 1995.247 The CERCLA exemption has never been invoked.
The Army claims that it is "simply unrealistic to expect the
military to request exemptions for training that must occur on a
regular basis. 2 4' The EPA, however, has called such exemptions
243 Id.
244 Id. at 7.
245 See 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (2000) ("The President may exempt any solid waste
management facility of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the
executive branch from compliance with such a requirement if he determines it
to be in the paramount interest of the United States to do so."); 42 U.S.C. §
9620(j)(1) (2000) ("The President may issue such orders regarding response
actions at any specified site or facility of the Department of Energy or the
Department of Defense as may be necessary to protect the national security
interests of the United States at that site or facility.").
246 Exec. Order No. 12,244, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,443 (Oct. 3, 1980). President Reagan
renewed this exemption a year later. Exec. Order No. 12,327, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,893 (Oct. 1, 1981).
247 Presidential Determination No. 95-45, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,823 (Sept. 29, 1995).
This exemption has been renewed every year since then. See, e.g., Presidential
Determination No. 2003-39, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,279 (Sept. 16, 2003).
243 Fatz, supra note 17, at 4; see also ROUNDTABLE, supra note 25, at 11. DOD
also worries that a court might overturn an exemption by ruling that it was not
in the "paramount interest of the United States." See DuBois Testimony, supra
note 64, at 7 n.2 (citing dicta in Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir.
1998)). In addition, DOD cites a 1981 decision declaring that "there is a
distinction between 'solid waste management facility or disposal site,'.., which
the President can exempt, and an 'activity resulting, or which may result, in the
disposal of solid waste or hazardous waste,' . . . which the President has no
authority to exempt." Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1048 (D.P.R.
1981) (internal citations omitted), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Marquez-
Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981). According to a Pentagon spokes-
man, this precedent might furnish the basis for a ruling that while an
operational range could be exempted as a "solid waste management facility," the
military training activity itself could not be. DuBois Testimony, supra note 64,
at 7 n.3.
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"a viable option .... Should there be a need for a waiver at an
individual installation, the Services should make use of the options
already at their disposal." '249
DOD's proposed amendments to RCRA and CERCLA were
introduced in one version of the Senate Defense Authorization bill
for Fiscal Year 2004, which was not passed, but they were not
included in the House bill. Instead, Congress directed DOD to
conduct a comprehensive study of the professed need for changes
in the law, including "a description and analysis of the types and
degree" of problems encountered in complying with the require-
ments of RCRA and CERCLA at all military installations, as well
as the impact on "operational training activities.""25 The study is
to be completed by the end of January 2006.251 Meanwhile, the
proposed amendments were not included in the Defense Authoriza-
tion bills for either 2005 or 2006 as introduced in either house.
E. Clean Air Act
The last of the environmental statutes targeted by DOD's
RRPI is the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). 252 The CAA currently prohibits
federal facilities, including military bases, from engaging in any
activity that does not conform to an approved state implementa-
tion plan ("SIP").253 DOD now seeks additional time for bases and
states to "accommodate or offset emissions from military readiness
activities" in order to come into compliance with the CAA.254
The Pentagon says it needs three years to deploy new
weaponry at various installations and to move or "realign,"
existing forces among its various bases without having to worry
249 EPA Comments, supra note 243, at 8; see also Letter from Nat'l Assoc. of
Att'ys Gen. to Sen. John W. Warner et al. (Apr. 19, 2004) (vigorously criticizing
the proposed amendments), available at http://www.cpeo.org/dodexemptions/
NAAG%201etter%202004.pdf.
250 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136,
§§ 320(a)(3), (c), 117 Stat. 1392, 1435-36 (2003).
251 Id. § 320(e)(2), 117 Stat. at 1437.
252 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
253 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (2000).
254 READINESS SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 5.
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about impacts on air quality.2 5 Engines for virtually all new
weapons systems will burn hotter, and will therefore emit more
nitrogen oxides ("NOx"), although they will also tend to emit lower
levels of carbon monoxide ("CO") and volatile organic compounds
("VOCs")" 6 This could present a serious obstacle to deployment of
the new Joint Strike Fighter and the Marines' Advanced Amphibi-
ous Assault Vehicle in current nonattainment areas in Southern
California. According to DOD, the need will become more acute as
it enters its 2005 base closure round, when the relocation of a
fighter aircraft squadron from a closing base to one remaining
open might exacerbate existing air quality problems at the new
location.257
The Pentagon's proposal would suspend for three years the
requirement for conformity with SIPs for new "military readiness
activities.' '25' However, the period of suspension could begin at any
255 See Dep't of Def., Fact Sheet: Military Basing, Training, and the Clean Air Act
(n.d.), available at http://aec.army.mil/usaec/publicaffairs/rrpi03.pdf.
256 Id.
257 READINESS SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 5.
25 The latest proposal, sent to Congress on April 7, 2005, in its proposed
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, is available at
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/FY06NDAABillText.pdf [hereinafter Latest
Proposal]. It provides, in part,
Section 313. Air Quality Plans
(a) Conformity with Clean Air Act.-In all cases in which the
requirements of section 176(c) of the Clean Air Act would have
applied to proposed military readiness activities, the
Department shall not be prohibited from engaging in such
military readiness activities and it shall have up to three years,
from the date such activities begin, to satisfy the requirements
of that section, provided:
(1) the Department of Defense has provided the state in which
the proposed military readiness activities would occur an
estimate of the annual emissions caused by the proposed
military readiness activities for all criteria pollutants for which
the area is designated "nonattainment" or "maintenance"; [sic]
and
(2) the state provides written concurrence with the extension of
up to three years.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
time in the future. With the transfer of activities from base to base,
or the reorganization of an activity at a single base, this provision
might allow a base to remain out of conformity indefinitely.259 Such
a suspension would not prevent the EPA from approving an
otherwise adequate state plan or plan revision in the interim.26 °
The proposed amendment would also excuse states from taking
special measures during this interim period to bring nonattain-
ment areas into compliance when violations of standards for ozone,
carbon monoxide, or particulate matter were attributable to
military readiness activities.2 6'
Critics warn that these measures would make it impossible
for state and local officials to protect their citizens from airborne
health threats, except by restricting private economic activity to
compensate for the military's pollution.262 DOD insists that these
fears are overblown, since the proposed amendments would
temporarily authorize increases typically amounting to less than
0.5% of total emissions in each region. Nevertheless, the amend-
ments include no limits.
As with most other federal environmental laws, the
President can waive Clean Air Act requirements for one year upon
a finding of "paramount interest of the United States" for any
federal emission source, or for three years for weaponry, aircraft,
vehicles or other uniquely military equipment.263 EPA regulations
implementing the Clean Air Act also provide that conformity with
SIPs is not required for agency "[a]ctions in response to emergen-
cies," presumably including a terrorist attack. Those actions might
continue out of conformity indefinitely "due to overriding concerns
259 See Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democratic Staff, Fact Sheet: DOD
Exemptions from the Clean Air Act (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://www.house.
gov/commerce democrats/DODexemptions/factsheet.2.shtml.
260 Latest Proposal, supra note 258, § 313(b).
261 Id. §§ 313(c), (e).
262 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 190, at 3.
263 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (2000). No waiver is available for standards of perfor-
mance for new stationary sources, however.
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for . . . national security interests and foreign policy commit-
ments. 264
Congress, like many others, apparently is not yet convinced
of the need for the proposed change. In 2003, it failed to approve
the proposed amendments and ordered DOD instead to make a
comprehensive study of problems in compliance with the existing
law, and to report the results by the end of January 2006.265
Pending the results of the study, the amendments did not make it
into the Defense Authorization bills for 2005 or 2006.
CONCLUSION
Some argue that the DOD's Range and Readiness Preserva-
tion Initiative is opportunistic, even exploitive, as it plays on the
fears of Americans in the wake of the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001.266 There is plenty of evidence to support that view. I
am convinced, however, that the nation's military leadership is
sincere in its desire to keep the American people safe from harm,
while at the same time protecting the values we say we would
be willing to fight and die for. Among those values is a clean,
beautiful, healthy environment.
Environmental compromises will sometimes be necessary in
the interest of national security. Yet as the Supreme Court noted
in a different context, "this concept of 'national defense' cannot be
deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power
designed to promote such a goal."26'
264 40 C.F.R. §§ 93.153(d)(2), (e)(1) (2005).
265 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136,
§§ 320(a)(2), (e)(2), 117 Stat. 1392, 1435, 1437 (2003).266 See, e.g., Press Release, Natural Res. Def. Council, Senate Exempts Department
of Defense from Key Environmental Laws, Threatening Wildlife (Nov. 12, 2003),
available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/031112a.asp (quoting Karen
Wayland, acting legislative director for the Natural Resources Defense Council,
stating that "[t]he Congress has served as a willing accomplice to the Bush
administration's shameful exploitation of national security as an excuse to
sacrifice our natural heritage').
267 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1968).
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We should have learned from our experience during the Cold
War that if trade-offs are to be made, they ought to be the result
of a thorough analysis of the interests at stake, as well as a robust
public discussion. My reading of the Pentagon's efforts since
September 11, 2001, and Congress's response, convinces me that
in the rush to amend three of this country's most important
environmental statutes neither of these criteria has been met. At
this point, we can only guess at the long-term consequences of
these changes. In such a state of uncertainty, we should insist on
a much clearer justification for any additional changes.
